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“Nature stretches without a break from lifeless objects to animals through
things that are animated but not animals, so that there seems to be very little
difference between one thing and the next, they are so close together.”
Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium 1

I

n his paper, “The State and Fate of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind,”
John Haldane likens the present condition of Philosophy of Mind to that
of the philosophically stultifying period of late scholasticism, where naming
took the place of explaining, and philosophy was reduced to taxonomy.2
Haldane argues that our current physicalistic lexicon has made it virtually
“impossible to accommodate the basic features of mindedness revealed in reﬂection
and direct experience.”3 For Philosophy of Mind to progress, Haldane argues, we
must “make space” for alternative modes of knowing that exist beyond the bounds
of our current, overly physicalistic terminology.
Similar to Haldane, but offering a much bleaker picture of contemporary
Philosophy of Mind, is Colin McGinn. In his essay, “Can We Solve the
Mind-Body Problem?” McGinn advances what he refers to as his Mysterian
view of consciousness, the view that human cognition is, by design, simply
incapable of generating the concept(s) necessary for adequately explaining
psycho-physical interaction. Just as a dog’s mind is cognitively closed to the
concepts of Einsteinian Physics, so too, McGinn argues, is the human mind
cognitively closed to the property that links mind and body. McGinn therefore
concludes that the mind-body problem is fundamentally insoluble.4
Surveying the landscape of contemporary Philosophy of Mind from two
rather different vantage points, Haldane and McGinn nonetheless arrive at
very similar conclusions. Whereas both agree that contemporary Philosophy
of Mind has reached an impasse, and that the language we currently use when
speaking about consciousness is fundamentally inadequate, Haldane argues
that what is necessary for Philosophy of Mind to advance is the generation
of new language, and McGinn concludes that such language is nowhere to
be found.
In this paper I argue that the impasse suggested by Haldane and McGinn
directly stems from the presupposed notion of a sharp, binary distinction
between mind and body. Hardly ever stated outright, this presupposition
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is instead expressed tacitly through their presentation of the
hard problem-that the physical as we deﬁne it cannot in any
meaningful causal way bring about the mental, for the two are
divided by a seemingly unbridgeable gap. What is therefore
necessary, I argue, is a new way of looking at the mind-body
problem that gets us away from seeing and speaking of reality
strictly in terms of a discrete subject/object divide. In this paper
I propose that the sharp distinction between mind and body,
often assumed by many philosophers to be metaphysically
foundational, is in fact false, and rather, that mind and body
coexist upon an unbroken, graded continuum. If we thereby
grant ontological primacy to a continuum of mind and body,
we are now presented with a possible alternative explanation
of consciousness that avoids to a large extent, the glaring
inconsistencies of substantival Dualism as well as the woeful
incompleteness of classic Physicalism.5 Furthermore, this
new ontology provides a possible new starting point for both
Haldane and McGinn; one that might provide Haldane the
new language he is searching for, and likewise, one that might
serve to rescue McGinn from the conceptual dead-end created
by our present language. Accordingly, for the functional
purposes of this paper I will here on out refer to this alternative
viewpoint as a Continuist explanation of consciousness.

found in the world of bivalent logic and language. Given
this incongruity between abstract logic and the experienced
world, Clark concludes that these so-called “laws” are either
false, or alternatively, that they “identify a reality distinct from
the ordinary world of experience, and also from the ultimate
source of reality.”6 Clark’s argument thereby suggests that
without clear-cut, distinct boundaries differentiating between
one atomic simple or “thing” and another (as the laws of logic
would lead us to believe), reality is therefore not at all discrete
but instead, an unbroken, contiguous spectrum. As Clark puts
it, “our reality is ineradicably continuous, and there are therefore
no abrupt changes of the kind that logic and language might
lead us to suppose.”7

In this paper I will attempt to further develop this Continuist
conception of mind and body. I will do so in two parts. The
ﬁrst part of this paper will be devoted to the task of ﬁnding
an adequate metaphysics in which to ground our theory.
Borrowing from Stephen R.L. Clark’s, “Deconstructing the
Laws of Logic”, I will attempt to show how the epistemological
problems raised by Clark suggest a metaphysical reality that
is fundamentally continuous rather than discrete or atomistic.
Once this grounding is ﬁrmly established, I will move on to
the second part of this paper where I will attempt to extend
this concept of continuity speciﬁcally to the mind-body
problem, building upon the conceptual scaffolding laid forth
in the Synechism of C.S. Pierce. Using Pierce, I will attempt
to advance this Continuist position in strong hopes that it will
allow us to view consciousness and the mind-body problem
through fresh eyes.

He then asks us to imagine a given segment, spatial or temporal,
extending from L1, through L2, to L3. That is, L1 – L2 – L3
could represent one thing next to another (in space) or one
thing leading to another (in time). Next, Clark asks us to
imagine an x, such that, from L1 to L2, x is A, and from L2 to
L3, x is ~A (as depicted below).
x=A
x = ~A
L1 ============= L2============ L3

Blurring the Line
Before we set about the task of further developing this
Continuist position, we must ﬁrst provide it with an adequate
metaphysical foundation on which to stand. As brieﬂy stated
before, one incipient solution ﬁt for the task can be found in
Stephen R.L. Clark’s, “Deconstructing the Laws of Logic”. In
his essay, Clark challenges the ontological status of some of the
bedrock foundations of formal Logic. Clark argues that our
lived reality is that of an unbroken, continuous spectrum of
experience, absent of the clean, crisp, and discrete distinctions
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

In his essay, Clark exposes some of the paradoxes and
inconsistencies latent within formal logic by pitting the law of
Non-Contradiction against the law of Excluded Middle. He
does so in the following manner. Clark ﬁrst reminds us of the
two laws of logic in question;
1.) The Law of Excluded Middle (EM): either p or ~p
2.) The Law of Non-Contradiction (NC): not both p and ~p.

With this scenario ﬁrmly in place, Clark asks; if x is A prior to
L2, and x is ~A after L2, then what is x immediately at L2? Here
is where the problem begins to rear its head. If we conclude that
x is both A and ~A then the Law of Non Contradiction fails.
Conversely, if we say that x is neither A or ~A then the Law of
Excluded Middle fails.8 A potential solution that appears to
get us around this problem, while preserving the integrity of
both laws, is to assert that, “the laws of logic only apply within
a discontinuous world, where there are no points between
adjacent points, so that the object is A from L1 to L2, and not
A from L2* to L3, but through L2 and L2* are different, there
are no points at all between them.”9 But even this move leads us
to an equally undesirable conclusion.
If we are to assert that there are in fact no points through L2
and L2*, then what we are left with, it would seem, is a peculiar
type of ‘nothing’; a concept very similar, Clark argues, to that
of Epicurus’ “void”. To assert this void, Clark argues, still does
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us no good, for it would seem that there must be a place where
point and void touch, and in so doing, leaving that place of
contact subject to the same argument as before. Furthermore,
the ontological consequence of asserting a void go far beyond
the localized case of L2 and L2*; its ramiﬁcations extending
throughout the entire segment of L1 to L3. If we assert that it
is neither true nor false that x is A (or ~A) at the speciﬁc point
of L2, then the implication is that we cannot say that x is A at
any point between L1 and L3. As Clark puts it, “While it may
seem that, if there are truths, they must be true at any point
in the period during which they are true, we might conclude
instead that periods are not made up of points. That is; our reality
is ineradicably continuous.”10 (My italics.)
What then must we conclude from the problems raised by
Clark’s argument? If Clark is correct, then it seems we are
unable to deﬁnitively pin down the truth status of a single,
atomistic point. This conclusion forces us to ask the following
question; what must reality fundamentally be like to allow for
such consequences? One possible metaphysical solution, not
too far reaching, is to conclude that reality is not at all discrete
or atomistic, but rather, that it is fundamentally continuous.
If reality is continuous in the way that Clark suggests, then
may it also not be continuous in regard to Mind-Body, where
the two are not sharp metaphysical categories but, rather, poles
on a continuous line? By following this line of thought, we can
begin to solve the hard problem.
Towards Continuity
How then does this Continuist ontology speciﬁcally apply
to the mind-body problem? One immediately recognizable
advantage to positing a continuum of mind and body is that it
promises to eliminate the problem of having to bridge the socalled “explanatory gap” between the world of the mental and
the world of the physical. For on the Continuist view, there
is no gap. Since Descartes, the Achilles’ Heel of substantival
Dualism has been that of trying to explain psycho-physical
interaction without reliance upon some sort of “bridge entity”
to ﬁll this gap.11 For Descartes this bridge entity took the form
of the pineal gland. Descartes posited that the pineal gland
contained additional bridge entities, both will (mind) and spirit
(body), and thus could function as the interface point where
the worlds of mental and physical came into contact with one
another. This move however failed to resolve the issue, as all it
did was compress the problem of mind-body interaction into
the localized microcosm of the pineal gland, leaving us with
the same inherent dualism as before. That is, as long as we
are dealing in terms of mental and physical, then the bridge
spanning the chasm between mind and body must therefore be
made of either the mental or the physical. If it is physical then
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it fails to connect to the mental. If it is mental then it fails to
connect to the physical. Thus, the positing of a bridge entity
does us no good in crossing the mind-body divide.
Mind-Body Continuism, however, provides us with a potential
way around this problem. By putting mind and body on a
continuum, we are no longer faced with the intractable problem
of having to reconcile two radically dichotomous worlds. Rather,
the world of the mental and world of the physical would now
inhabit one shared world along the continuum, with aspects of
both mind and body extending into and interpenetrating one
another in myriad forms and fashions.12 In short, mind and
body would now differ only in degree but no longer in kind.
Thus, the problem of bridging the explanatory gap between
mind and body would be effectively eliminated, for the gap
would no longer be there.
As a further remark, and one pointing to the profound
advantage of Continuism, consider the issue of causation
and the hard problem. Under the common formulations of
causation, a given object or event, existing in prior space-time,
is often said to be the cause of another object or event existing
in later space-time, if it meets certain criteria. However, under
a Continuist ontology, this formulation of causality fails, for it
depends on there being these independent, discrete identities
of the objects of cause and effect. However, since Continuism
does away with all sharp, discrete edges, the integrity of the
atomic identities of cause and effect dissolve. Thus, it would
make little sense to speak of A causing B, for in a sense, at the
point of contact A is B, or, in the spirit of Aristotle’s De Partibus
Animalium, “there seems to be very little difference between
one thing and the next, they are so close together.”13
As Clark demonstrates, just as there is ambiguity regarding
truth status of a given point (in time or space), so too is there
ambiguity regarding the point of causal contact between cause
and effect. With no clear distinction as to where cause ends
and effect begins, discussion of mind-body interaction becomes
increasingly difﬁcult on the standard dualist line. But this
is precisely the strength of Continuism, since it offers a way
out of the hard problem by denying that there is a sharp
distinction between mind and body in the ﬁrst place. Hence,
the possibility is now created for formulations of mind-body
interaction without reliance upon dualistic bridge entities or
dualistic language that take the standard form of either “mind”
or “body” and thus result in contradiction. Instead, under this
new Continuist ontology, we can now make formulations of
mind-body interaction using Continuist entities that take the
form of neither “mind” nor “body,” or both “mind” and “body.”
Whatever language we come up with to “bridge the gap,” so
to speak, it will have to be of a Continuist order, according to
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

Continuism, and thus, following Clark, will present us with
entities that are neither/nor or both/and “mind” and “body.”
A ﬁnal advantage of Continuism is that it preserves, equally,
aspects of both mind and body without seeking to reduce one to
the other. Unlike an Idealism that attempts to explain matter in
terms of mind, or a Physicalism that attempts to explain mind
in terms of matter, Continuism provides a metaphysics that
puts mind and body on equal ontological footing. Another
position that likewise attempts to end the tug of war between
Idealism and Physicalism by granting equal ontological status to
mind and body is Russell’s Neutral Monism. However, unlike
Neutral Monism, Continuism does not run into the problem
of introducing a third metaphysical category, “the neutral”,
and then having to explain how it is that this third category
interacts with or brings about the categories of mind and body.
Rather than introducing an additional metaphysical category,
Continuism, in fact, does the complete opposite by attempting
to dissolve the absolute division of the metaphysical categories
of mind and body altogether into a continuist relation.

What is necessary for contemporary Philosophy of Mind to
progress is the reformulation of both solution and question in
a way that allows us to speak of things in any other way than
in terms of a strict mind/body dichotomy. The Continuist
viewpoint that I have advanced in this paper, though far from
perfect, at the very least makes an honest attempt to break out
from the standard mold and to try something new, for the old
certainly isn’t working. From Maxwell’s merging of electricity
and magnetism, to Einstein’s uniﬁcation of matter and energy,
to the formulation of a “space-time continuum”, and even to
the fall of the Berlin Wall; progress, as it were, in virtually every
area of human endeavor, has come in the form of the dissolution
of presumed boundaries and the uniﬁcation of seemingly
irreconcilable parts. Is it really then so hard to imagine that
one day we might come to discover that the impenetrable wall
separating mind and body, subject and object, seer and the
thing seen, might turn out to be equally permeable and not so
solid after all?
Endnotes

More so than Russell’s Neutral Monism, Mind-Body
Continuism most closely resembles the doctrine of Synechism
advocated by C.S. Pierce. Pierce deﬁnes Synechism as “the
tendency to regard continuity as an idea of prime importance
in Philosophy.”14 This theme of continuity echoes throughout
all of Pierce’s works to include his writings regarding mind and
body. Under a Piercean ontology, mind is seen as extending
continuously throughout all of nature by different degrees and
in different concentrations. Thus, what we commonly call
matter is, according to Pierce, really mind but in a “degraded or
undeveloped” form.15 Likewise, Pierce regards the mechanical
laws of nature as being, “acquired habits, like all the regularities
of mind.”16 Pierce therefore concludes that “[t]he idealist has no
reason to dread a mechanistic theory of life.”17 Although Pierce
advocates more of an Idealist position than a truly Continuist
position his writings nonetheless present a conception of mind
that attempts to avoid the sharp mind/body distinction.
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